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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of its existence or could have been made aware of its existence by
an inspection of the land.
The Simmel case offers a good example of the trend in some
jurisdictions toward imposing a greater burden of care on the landowner in regard to infant trespassers. While such an extension of
the landowner's liability may be practical in highly urbanized jurisdictions, it would not seem to be desirable or necessary to impose
this additional duty on a landowner in a jurisdiction such as West
Virginia, which has few densely populated centers.
Nevertheless, the instant West Virginia case suggests the need
for a redefining of the dangerous instrumentality rule. The court,
while consistently repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine, has
applied a dangerous instrumentality rule which is in essence little
more than a modification of the doctrine itself. This basic anomaly
results in uncertainty, not only as to the extent of the landowner's
duty of care and liability, but also as to the elements and proof the
plaintiff must show in order to recover.
It would seem then, that a modem dangerous instrumentality
rule should not only reflect an intention to keep the landowner's
liability within reasonable limits, but should also incorporate and
set out more definite standards regarding duty of care, liability,
and recovery. It is submitted that this two-fold purpose could best
be effected by adoption of the rules set out in RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 389 (1934).
D. L. McC.

Wn.s-HOLoGAPiimc

CANCELLATION

OF LIFE ESTATE ALSO

CANCELS REMAINDER.-By holographic will, T left a life estate in the
sum of tventy thousand dollars to each of five named beneficiaries,
and at the death of each, the principal to a charity. Before his
death, ' lined out the names of two of the designated life tenants.
Held, that inasmuch as the will must be given effect as it appeared
at T's death, deletion of the life estates also deleted the dependent
remainders. Sheltering Arms Hospital v. First and Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 100 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1957).

By nearly identical statutes, holographic wills-those wholly in
the handwriting of the testator-are valid in the Virginias. W. VA.
CODE c. 41, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-51
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(Michie 1950). A holographic will may be altered in the same
manner as it was executed; and after alteration or amendment, as
by obliteration or cancellation, or by interlineation, the part that
remains is the testator's valid will. W. VA. CODE C.41, art. 1, § 7
(Michie 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-59 (Michie 1950). Stated
otherwise, a testator may make any change which he desires in his
holographic will, so long as he makes the change in his own handwriting; such a change re-executes the will as altered without the
necessity for rewriting the instrument or signing it again. LaRue v.
Lee, 63 W. Va. 388, 60 S.E. 388 (1908); Moyers v. Gregory,
175 Va. 230, 7 S.E.2d 881 (1940).
A valid revocation or alteration of a will requires both an
actual physical defacement by the testator joined with his intent to
revoke or alter. Nelson v. Ratliffe, 137 W. Va. 27, 69 S.E.2d 217
(1952); Franklin v. McLean, 192 Va. 684, 66 S.E.2d 504 (1951).
There is a presumption that alterations in a holographic will remaining in the testators possession were made by him. Wilkes v. Wilkes,
115 Va. 886, 80 S.E. 745 (1914); cf. Canterberry v. Canterberry,
120 W. Va. 310, 197 S.E. 809 (1938). Apparently this presumption
is broad enough to also infer that such alterations were made with
the intent to alter.
The intent of the testator, if not in conflict with a rule of law,
is controlling in construing a will. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 125 W. Va.
702, 25 S.E.2d 872 (1943); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Herndon, 181 Va. 17, 23 S.E.2d 768 (1943). His intent must, however, be determined from what he actually said in the will, and not
from what he might have intended to say, or what he should have
said. Hunt v. Furman, 132 W. Va. 706, 52 S.E.2d 816 (1949);
Chavis v. Myrick, 190 Va. 875, 58 S.E.2d 881 (1950). The courts
will not interpret a will if its words are clear and unambiguous.
Wilcox v. Mowrey, 125 W. Va. 333, 24 S.E.2d 922 (1943); White v.
White, 183 Va. 239, 31 S.E.2d 558 (1944).
Provided that physical alteration by the testator and his intent
to so alter are established, and not rebutted if established by
presumption, the amended will stands re-executed as altered, and
its former content can not be used to aid in its construction. Ruth v.
Jester,198 Va. 887, 96 S.E.2d 741 (1957). Thus in the instant case,
deletion of the names of two life tenants left the will reading as
though there had been a life estate to each of three named beneficiaries with remainder to charity after the death of each, even
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though it may have been the testator's actual intention to leave a
gift of one hundred thousand dollars to the charity with a number
of intervening life estates rather than a number of twenty thousand
dollar life estates with remainders following. After the cancellation
of two names there were no estates to carry the remainders with
respect to the deleted gifts, nor were there any words to indicate
that the remainders were still existent so that they could be accelerated. Reading the re-executed will, it stands clear and unambiguous as altered, presenting no reason for inquiry into the
testator's intent.
Even had there been sufficient ambiguity on the face of the
instrument to justify inquiring into the testators intent, it is probable that the same result would have been reached, since the court
would have been limited in construction to the written words. If the
testator had intended that the charity receive the remainders after
the cancelled life estates, he could have interlined such an intention
in his own handwriting at the time of the cancellation, or at any other
time prior to his death. Failing this, it is a fair inference that he
intended to cancel the remainders as well as the life estates.
By limiting itself to consideration of words remaining after a
valid revocation of part of the will, when the words remaining are
clear and unambiguous, the Virginia court has reached a sound
result which should be followed in West Virginia and other jurisdictions having similar statutory provisions.
R. G. D.
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